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PREVENTION OF CHILD STEALING: THE NEED FOR A
NATIONAL POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year some 900,000 children are affected by their parents' di-
vorce.1 For many of these children the divorce and custody determi-
nation is the beginning of a long nightmare: the losing parent,
dissatisfied with the custody decision, seizes the child and flees to an-
other state in search of a more favorable decree. The sister state's
court then modifies the prior decree and rewards the parent's action.
The child becomes a pawn in a conflict between the embattled parents
which may continue for years:
[T]he struggle between divorced spouses over the custody of their
children has transcended the brutality and irregularity of guerrilla
warfare. The child is filched from the classroom, playground, public
street, or his home, transported out of the state and perhaps across
country by the abducting parent, there to be held pending a counter-
foray by the other parent. Meanwhile, each parent recruits the
assistance of his home court, sometimes of courts elsewhere, seeking
by various procedures to strengthen his grip on the child and to
loosen that of the other parent.
2
The willingness of courts to modify the custody decrees of sister states
has encouraged parents losing custody battles to abduct their children
and to remove them to another jurisdiction to obtain a new custody
determination. Further, the increasing divorce rate portends a corre-
sponding increase in the incidence of such child stealing. This com-
ment will examine the scope of the problem of child stealing,3 analyze
current methods for handling parental abductions, discuss suggested
reforms designed to curb child stealing,4 and propose a national policy
aimed at reducing the incidence of such abductions.
1. 123 CoNG. REc. S2982 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Sen. McGovern); Farr,
Van de Kamp Hits FBIon 'Stolen Children'Policy, L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, § 2, at 2, col. 6.
2. Hazard, May v. Andersorn Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. Rnv. 379, 392-93
(1959) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Hazard].
3. For the purposes of this comment, the terms "child stealing," "child snatching," "pa-
rental kidnapping," and "parental abduction" will be used synonymously. These terms re-
fer to a situation where one parent removes (and sometimes secrets) a child from the other
parent (or lawful custodian) in violation of a custody decree or in violation of the parent's
natural custody rights.
4. Several solutions, including legislation currently before Congress, have been proposed.
See text and authorities accompanying notes 178-81 infra.
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II. THE PROBLEM
Parental kidnapping is reaching appalling proportions. Although no
precise figures are available to indicate the number of children annu-
ally kidnapped by one of their parents, conservative estimates place the
number at 25,000' while other figures range as high as 100,000.6
The tragedy of parental kidnapping lies not merely in the fact that it
occurs, but also in the effects it has upon the children. The Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws have noted:
The harm done to children by these [abduction] experiences can
hardly be overestimated. It does not require an expert in the behav-
ioral sciences to know that a child, especially during his early years
and the years of growth, needs security and stability of environment
and a continuity of affection. A child who has never been given the
chance to develop a sense of belonging and whose personal attach-
ments when beginning to form are cruelly disrupted, may well be
crippled for life, to his own lasting detriment and the detriment of
society.7
Environmental stability is fundamental to the normal development and
maturation of a child.' Consequently, a child who has been shifted
between parents without a stable home environment is likely to be
slowed in both intellectual and emotional development. Lack of con-
tinuity in homelife may create severe conflicts within the child. A di-
vorce alone is likely to divide the child's loyalties between parents
resulting in a retardation of the development of positive relationships
5. 124 CONG. REc. S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop); 123 CONG.
REc. E6151 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Sawyer); Molinoff, Divorced Parents
Who Kidnap Their Own Children, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1977, § Parade, at 10 [hereinafter
cited as Molinoff]; Trescott, Child-Snatching: A Legal 'Crime, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1976, §
B, at 1, cols. 1-2; Kidnappings:.A Family Affair, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1976, at 24; Moving to
Stop Child Snatching, TIME, Feb. 27, 1978, at 85.
6. 123 CoNG. REc. H54 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Moss); Goodman, Child-
Snatching, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1976, § A, at 27, col. 6; Most, The Child-Stealing Epidemic,
224 NATION 559 (1977); Peterson, Child Snatching: The Extralegal Custody Battle After
Divorce, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1977, § C, at 36, col. 2; Smith, Retrieving Stolen Children-For
a Fee, L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1977, § 4, at 1, col. 2; Trescott, Child-Snatching: 4 Legal
'Crime', Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 1.
7. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM CMLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9
U.L.A. 99-100 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commissioners'Note].
8. One authority has argued that stability is "practically the principle [sic] element in
raising children, especially pre-puberty ones." He has further indicated that "a child can
handle almost anything better than he can handle instability." PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE ACT, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16, 1968) (remarks of Dr. An-
drew Watson), cited in Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. A Legis.
lative Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1208-09
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy].
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with either or both of the parents.' The disorientation generated by
the circumstances of a parental abduction is likely to exacerbate these
effects. 10
Child stealing is a gesture of hostility between the parents. The
child, confused by this highly emotional situation, may begin to believe
that he or she has been the cause of all of the problems and, as a result,
develop a severely negative self image." Such tragic results have led
one psychologist to label child stealing as "one of the most subtle and
brutal forms of child abuse."
1 2
The seriousness of the problem of parental kidnapping is clear. But
while few scholars or legislators would deny that such activity should
be discouraged, the law in most jurisdictions actually facilitates paren-
tal abductions.
III. CURRENT LAWS REGARDING CHILD STEALING
While violations of custody decrees may lead to criminal sanctions,13
child custody, under current law, is considered primarily a civil matter.
This approach has proven woefully inadequate to handle the problem
of parental kidnapping. The situation has been succinctly summarized
as follows: "WUnder the existing law of most states and countries, child-
snatching by a parent usually is condoned, often rewarded, and rarely
punished. Moreover, federal authorities and the Constitution to date
have displayed a 'hands off' attitude."' 4
9. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsTs OF THE CHILD
37-38 (1973) (footnote omitted). This treatise contains an excellent discussion of the child's
need for stability.
10. Dr. Anthony Atwell, director of Stanford University's Family Law Consultation Serv-
ice, has observed: "More often than not, the children are already torn in their loyalties and
[a parental abduction] may permanently prevent the child from having a realistic view of
both parents." Young, Parents Who Steal Children, PLAYGIRL, Feb. 1978, at 84.
11. Id. (comments of clinical psychologist Dr. Cassandra Brothers).
12. Moving to Stop Child Snatching, TIME, Feb. 27, 1978, at 85 (quoting psychologist Dr.
Philip Weeks).
13. See text and authorities accompanying notes 72-84 infra.
14. Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Casefor the Uniform Child
Custod, Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1011 (1977) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Foster & Freed]. This situation has changed little in the past few years. A decade
ago the Commissioners on Uniform Laws commented:
[T]hose who lose a court battle over custody are often unwilling to accept the judgment
of the court. They will remove the child in an unguarded moment or fail to return him
after a visit and will seek their luck in the court of a distant state where they hope to
find-and often do find-a more sympathetic ear for their plea for custody.
In this confused legal situation the person who has possession of the child has an
enormous tactical advantage. Physical presence of the child opens the doors of many
courts to the petitions and often assures him of a decision in his favor. It is not surpris-
ing then that custody claimants tend to take the law into their own hands, that they
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. There are two primary explanations for the incidence of parental
kidnapping under the current law. First, present custody adjudication
procedures promote forum-shopping. Custody decrees generally lack
finality and so may be disregarded or modified by foreign states. Sec-
ond, there are no effective sanctions for parental kidnapping. Current
civil and criminal penalties have proven ineffective in deterring child
stealing.
A. Custody Adjudication Procedures
Current custody adjudication procedures facilitate child stealing be-
cause more than one state may be able to claim subject matter jurisdic-
tion in an individual custody case.'" A state with concurrent
jurisdiction may be unwilling to recognize and enforce a sister state's
custody decree and may modify the prior decree or render a new one.'6
Thus, the parent who loses a custody battle in the primary jurisdiction
might be motivated to abduct and transfer the child to another jurisdic-
tion in search of a more favorable custody decree.
1. Jurisdiction in Custody Cases and Modification of Custody
Decrees
While there is no universal formula for determining jurisdiction in
child custody cases, most states claim subject matter jurisdiction on the
basis of the domicile of the child, the presence of the child, or personal
jurisdiction over the child's parents. Any one of these bases is suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction. 7 Consequently, this permits two or more
states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in a child custody case. Even
when a second state could not initially have exercised jurisdiction, a
losing parent need only remove the child to another state where a court
may claim jurisdiction based on the child's presence. As a result, juris-
dictional limits do not bar a parent from abducting the child and flee-
ing to a foreign state in search of a more favorable custody decree.
Since one of the primary motives for child stealing is to seek a more
favorable custody decree, some parental abductions would be deterred
resort to self-help in the form of child stealing, kidnapping, or various other schemes to
gain possession of the child.
Commissioners' Note, supra note 7, at 99, 101.
15. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
16. Commissioners'Note, supra note 7, at 100. For a discussion of the effect of full faith
and credit see text and authorities accompanying notes 31-50 infra.
17. This position was first established in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197
P.2d 739 (1948). It was subsequently adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
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if state courts were willing to enforce the custody decrees of sister
states. Unfortunately, trial courts are frequently unwilling to defer to
the judgments of other states.8 This phenomenon is probably largely
due to each judge's feeling that he or she can render a decree which is
more fully informed than that rendered by the previous judge. 19 Mod-
ifications have also been common because courts have tended to over-
emphasize the need for fluidity (instead of stability) in custody
decrees.20
Courts usually depend upon one of three reasons in refusing to rec-
ognize or enforce the custody awards of sister states. The first reason
is that the sister state lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 1  Reexamina-
tion is allowed in this instance because the child was neither domiciled
nor present in the state making the award (rendering the decision a
nullity) or because both parents were not before the court and hence
the rights of the absent parent could not be determined. 2  The second
justification relied upon for reexamining a custody adjudication is that
a change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child has oc-
curred.3 A decree may be viewed as binding only at the time it was
rendered and the decision easily reconsidered. The third rationale for
a custody modification is that since states have concurrent jurisdiction
over child custody, a prior decree from a foreign state is not binding on
a sister state.2' On this basis, the custody issues may be completely
readjudicated. These approaches provide the grounds upon which
18. See Bodenheimer, Multiolicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of Calfornia
Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703, 719-20 (1971); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 348 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Hudak, The
Plight ofthe Interstate Childin American Courts, 9 AKRON L. REv. 257, 273 (1975) and cases
cited therein [hereinafter cited as Hudak, Interstate Child].
19. Address by Justice Fairchild of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Conference of Chief
Justices (Aug. 1969), cited in Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 8, at 1211.
20. Commissioners' Note, supra note 7, at 100.
21. Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 271; Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Igno-
miny of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REv. 521, 533
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue].
22. Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 271; Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue, supra note
21, at 533.
23. Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 271; Hudak, Seize, Run, andSue, supra note
21, at 533-35; Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. Rav. 795, 798, 813
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]; Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their
Parents, 80 DICK. L. REv. 305, 317-18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legalized Kidnapping].
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966) where the court
apparently found that the mother had reformed from past criminal behavior. See also
Ehrenzweig, supra note 18, at 352. Ehrenzweig found that the changed circumstances doc-
trine was "rarely more than a manner of speech supporting a preconceived result." Id.
24. Hudak, Interstate Child, spra note 18, at 271-72; Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue, supra
note 21, at 534. See, e.g., Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
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courts will reexamine the decrees of sister states. The ability of courts
to claim jurisdiction based on the child's presence and the willingness
of courts to modify the decrees of sister states combine to provide an
incentive for a parent, discouraged by the loss of a custody battle in one
state, to abscond with the child to another jurisdiction seeking a reas-
sessment of the original decree or a new custody determination in his
or her favor.25
The doctrines of res judicata, full faith and credit,26 or comity
27
could arguably prevent readjudication of custody decrees by allowing
or requiring recognition and enforcement of sister states' decrees.
These doctrines, however, have proven ineffectual in preventing cus-
tody decree modifications.
2. Res Judicata and Full Faith and Credit in Custody Cases
In theory, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation by preventing
a rehearing on issues previously decided in another court. In reality,
however, the doctrine has done little to bar modification of custody
decrees. While some states recognize a prior custody decree as res
judicata as to those facts and conditions before the court when the de-
cree was granted,28 many courts allow a decree to be modified on the
basis of changed circumstances.29 Accordingly, even a custody decree
considered res judicata may still be altered by a sister state. Other
courts take the position that custody decrees are, by their very nature,
not final decrees and so are not res judicata as to any matters in-
volved.3 0 As a result, courts adhering to this position are willing to
reexamine foreign custody decrees. Thus, despite the recognition of
the doctrine of res judicata, a custody decree may be readjudicated in a
second forum.
While the doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent a rehearing
of previously adjudicated issues, the doctrine of full faith and credit is
designed to provide recognition and enforcement of the decrees of sis-
25. See Ratner, supra note 23, at 813.
26. For a discussion of the application of res judicata and full faith and credit to custody
decrees see text and authorities accompanying notes 28-50 infra.
27. For a discussion of the application of comity to custody decrees see text and authori-
ties accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
28. See McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Wilburn v. Wilbum,
210 A.2d 832 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
29. See Lyerla v. Lyerla, 195 Kan. 259, 403 P.2d 989 (1965); In re Leete, 223 S.W. 962
(Mo. Ct. App. 1920).
30. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir. 1945); Proctor v. Proctor, 245 A.2d 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968); Anderson v. Anderson, 36
Wis. 2d 455, 153 N.W.2d 627 (1967).
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ter states. The United States Constitution states that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."31 Although, in theory, this
language would seem to provide a basis for the protection of child cus-
tody decrees, the Supreme Court has yet to recognize such protection.
On four occasions the Supreme Court has been confronted with cases
where the full faith and credit clause might have been applied to bar
reexamination of a custody decree, but in each case the Court failed to
apply the clause to prevent custody modifications.
In the first of these cases, Halvey v. Halvey,32 the Court was
presented with a New York modification of a Florida custody decree.
In 1945 Mrs. Halvey filed for a divorce in Florida. The day before the
decree was granted giving Mrs. Halvey a divorce and permanent cus-
tody of her son, Mr. Halvey removed the son to New York. Mrs.
Halvey then brought a habeas corpus action in New York to regain
custody of the child. The New York court ordered that custody re-
main with the mother but granted the father visitation rights not pro-
vided in the Florida decree. While not directly addressing the issue of
full faith and credit for custody decrees, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the New York court's action, concluding that since Flor-
ida could modify the decree, New York could also modify the decree.
The Court stated that: "the State of the forum has at least as much
leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as
does the State where it was rendered."33
The Halvey decision is unfortunate because it allows endless forum-
shopping in custody cases. Whenever a custody decree could be al-
tered by the rendering court, and another state's court is able to claim
subject matter jurisdiction, 4 that state can ignore the custody decision
of the original forum and relitigate any custody issues on which new
information has arisen subsequent to the original hearing. This result
may occur even though the second state may have limited access to
relevant information. The Halvey decision thus encourages judicial
competition in custody matters. In addition, the case provides an in-
centive for child snatching. The unhappy parent may perceive that the
possibility of a more favorable custody determination is greater in an-
other jurisdiction and so snatch and transport the child to a foreign
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
32. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
33. Id. at 615.
34. See text and authorities accompanying note 17 supra.
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jurisdiction to petition the courts there for custody.35
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to analyze the cus-
tody/full faith and credit issue in May v. Anderson.36 In that case, Mr.
Anderson had been granted a divorce and custody of his children in an
ex parte Wisconsin proceeding. In that proceeding, the Wisconsin
court did not have jurisdiction over the children's mother. Some years
later, the mother refused to surrender the children after they visited
with her in Ohio. Mr. Anderson then brought a habeas corpus action
in Ohio (relying on the Wisconsin decree) and was granted possession
of the children; the United States Supreme Court reversed this deci-
sion. Illustrating the difficulty the Court has had in this area, the jus-
tices divided four ways. Justice Burton, writing for the plurality,
framed the issue as follows: "the elemental question whether a court
of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present,
may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and
companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over
her in Personam."37  Justice Burton continued by stating that "a
mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right" which
could not be taken without personal jurisdiction over her.38 Only the
plurality embraced this view. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion, reasoned that since a state's primary duty was to the child,
custody decrees were never entitled to full faith and credit: "[T]he
child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon the State that its
responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another
time."'39 On the other hand, the dissenting justices assumed that full
faith and credit should be applied to custody decrees. 40
The plurality opinion in May has been severely criticized. 41 The
approach taken therein seemingly promotes parental abductions. Jus-
tice Jackson, dissenting in May, argued that the failure to grant full
faith and credit "seems to reduce the law of custody to a rule of seize-
and-run." 42  He further indicated that under the plurality approach
"[tihe convenience of a leave-taking parent is placed above the welfare
35. See the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in Halvey, 330 U.S. at 619-20.
36. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
37. Id. at 533.
38. Id. at 534.
39. Id. at 536.
40. Id. at 537, 539 (Jackson & Reed, JJ., dissenting); id. at 543 (Minton, J., dissenting).
41. See Hazard, supra note 2; Comment, Long-Ann Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody
Cases, 73 COLuM. L. Rav. 289, 310-11 (1973).
42. 345 U.S. at 542.
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of the child, but neither party is greatly aided in obtaining a deci-
sion."43 Justice Jackson concluded that "[a] state of the law such as
this, where possession apparently is not merely nine points of the law
but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to com-
mend it in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal system." 44
While more limited readings of May have been suggested,45 the case
has done little to clarify the effect of the doctrine of full faith and credit
on custody decrees.
Two later cases also presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court
to bar foreign custody relitigation through the doctrine of full faith and
credit, but in both cases the Court declined to do so. Both Kovacs v.
Brewer46 and Ford v. Ford47 followed the Halvey-May line of thinking.
In addition, Kovacs recognized a court's ability to modify a sister
state's custody decree on the rationale that circumstances had changed
since the prior decree was rendered.48
43. Id. at 539.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Commissioners' Note to Section 13, UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIC-
TION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 103, 121 (1973); Ratner, supra note 23, at 805; Comment, The Jurisdic-
tion of Texas Courts in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Functional Approach, 54 TEx. L.
REv. 1008, 1012-13 (1976).
46. 356 U.S. 604 (1958). In Kovacs the initial custody decree, rendered in New York
with all parties present, granted custody to the paternal grandfather. Subsequently, the
grandfather and the child established residence in North Carolina. Nearly four years after
the initial decree, and with all concerned parties before the court, the New York court modi-
fied the original decree and granted custody to the mother. When the mother sought en-
forcement of the decree fourteen months after the New York court's action, the grandfather
refused to surrender the child. The mother then sued in North Carolina to recover her
child. The North Carolina court determined, especially with reference to events that had
occurred after the New York court's modification of the order, that the best interests of the
child would be ensured by allowing the grandfather to retain custody. The United States
Supreme Court remanded the case to the North Carolina courts to determine the issue of
changed circumstances. The Court concluded that under the Halvey doctrine, if the North
Carolina courts found that a change in circumstances indicated that the best interests of the
child would be served by the grandfather's custody of the child, then a decision on the
constitutional issues would be unnecessary. Id. at 607-08.
47. 371 U.S. 187 (1962). In Ford the husband filed a writ of habeas corpus in Virginia
alleging that the mother was unfit and asking that he be awarded custody. On the basis of a
mutual agreement dividing custody, the Virginia court dismissed the case. Some nine
months later, when the children were with her, Mrs. Ford filed suit in South Carolina to
gain full custody of the children. The South Carolina court awarded custody to the mother
and refused to treat the Virginia court order as res judicata on the issue of fitness. The
United States Supreme Court held that the Virginia custody award was not res judicata in
Virginia, so that South Carolina was not required to treat the issue of custody as resjudicata.
Id. at 192-94. See also Note, Ford V. Ford- Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees,
73 YALE L.J. 134 (1963).
48. See text and authorities accompanying notes 23 & 29 supra.
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These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court has been consistently
reluctant to apply the full faith and credit clause to child custody
cases.4 9 Taken together, the cases seem to say that the courts of one
state may refuse to recognize a prior custody decree of another state if
one of the following conditions is present: (1) the first state could mod-
ify the decree for any reason, (2) circumstances have changed since the
prior decree was rendered, or (3) the defendant had possession of the
child and the initial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant. The effect of these cases is such that even if the applicability of
the full faith and credit clause to custody decrees were now recognized,
a court in a second state could still find grounds (such as the changed
circumstances doctrine) to modify a prior decree of another state.50
3. The Application of Comity to Custody Cases
Another doctrine which permits recognition of the decrees of a sister
state is that of comity.-' Under the doctrine of comity, a court, by
exercising its discretion, may recognize and enforce a foreign decree.
The doctrine is designed to promote respect for the decisions of the
courts of sister states; however, such recognition is permissive. A state
court might refuse to relitigate a prior sister state's custody decree. Yet
even in those jurisdictions which follow the doctrine, an allegation of
changed circumstances will allow review and modification of a prior
custody decree.52 As a result, comity does little to bar custody award
modification.
In an attempt to discourage parental abductions, some courts have
adopted a "clean hands" approach,53 refusing to reexamine a sister
state's custody award when the plaintiff parent has wilfully violated the
decree.' In a landmark decision, Exparle Mullins,5" the Washington
49. See generally Actions Taken By Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 14,
col 1.
50. As one commentator has stated: "The consequences of these four vapid decisions by
the United States Supreme Court have been disastrous to countless children of broken
homes. Increasing chaos and confusion have continued to be the products of child custody
litigation in American courts." Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 270.
51. At least eleven states have applied this doctrine in child custody litigation. Com-
ment, Conflict ofLaws: Child Custody and Foreign Judgments, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 307
n.13 (1972).
52. See Bodenheimer, The Unform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 FAM. L.Q. 304, 309
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Uniform Act]. See, e.g., Guardianship of Cam-
eron, 66 Cal. App. 2d 884, 153 P.2d 385 (1944).
53. This doctrine was first proposed by Ehrenzweig, supra note 18, at 357.
54. See Leathers v. Leathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853 (1958); Crocker v.
Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950).
55. 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946).
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Supreme Court, applying the clean hands rule, declared: "All reason-
ings and ideas of fair play and justice demand a holding that a parent
acting in disobedience to an order of a court, cannot secure a new dom-
icile for his or her child."56 Unfortunately, those states which recognize
this clean hands limitation have not been consistent in its application.57
Courts have refused to apply the doctrine on the ground that it would
be inequitable to punish the child for parental wrongs.5 Other courts
have excused abductions as not being so serious as to bar a judicial
determination based upon the merits and predicated upon the welfare
and interest of the child.59 While the application of the clean hands
doctrine might be helpful in discouraging parental kidnapping, the fail-
ure of courts to apply the doctrine consistently has virtually eradicated
any deterrent effect.
Clearly, res judicata, full faith and credit, and comity have not
solved the problem of parental kidnapping. Neither full faith and
credit nor the doctrine of res judicata require the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign custody decrees. Moreover, the doctrine of com-
ity is not applied to bar relitigation of custody issues with sufficient
frequency to deter potential child stealers. In an effort to find another
means to discourage child stealing and custody relitigation, courts have
experimented with the use of monetary incentives.
4. The Use of Bonds as a Method to Prevent Child Stealing
Some courts have attempted to prevent parental abductions and cus-
tody readjudication through the use of bonds. Under this procedure, a
court may require a noncustodial parent to post a bond when the court
grants permission for that parent to remove the child temporarily from
the court's jurisdiction. Return of the bond is conditioned upon com-
pliance with the terms of the order and return of the child.60
Although ostensibly providing an incentive to return the child, the
bond posting procedure is insufficient to prevent child stealing. It
may, for instance, be impossible to enforce the bond if the parent re-
mains beyond the boundaries of the court- only money is lost. As
56. id. at 445, 174 P.2d at 804.
57. Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 8, at 1215-16; Legalized Kidnapping,
supra note 23, at 319-21. Compare Leathers v. Leathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853
(1958) with In re Walker, 228 Cal. App 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1964).
58. See In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); Smith v.
Smith, 45 A.2d 879 (Del. Super. Ct. 1946).
59. See Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 98 A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1953).
60. Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 279; Hudak, Seize, Run, andSue, supra note
21, at 541.
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Page v. Page61 noted, the bond may ensure a monetary payment but
not the return of the child. Further, bonds are often set too low to
have any real effect.62
Review of the custody adjudication procedures indicates that they
not only fail to deter parental abductions, but, in fact, they encourage
such behavior. Since courts frequently do not recognize and enforce
sister states' prior custody decrees through res judicata, full faith and
credit, or comity, and readily modify these decrees through such doc-
trines as changed circumstances, a losing parent is motivated to flee
with the child to another jurisdiction to attempt to obtain a favorable
decree. Moreover, neither the application of the clean hands rule nor
the use of bonding appears likely to deter such parental behavior.
The failure of the custody adjudication process to handle the prob-
lem of parental abductions adequately might seem less important if
there were effective sanctions for such parental conduct. Unfortu-
nately, effective sanctions for child stealing do not exist.
B. The Lack of Effective Sanctions
Parental abductions could be punished through the use of contempt
proceedings, civil liability, or criminal penalties. Yet, as presently uti-
lized, none of these measures has proven effective in the area of paren-
tal kidnapping. The use of each of these punitive sanctions presents
serious difficulties.
1. Contempt
Civil contempt proceedings are designed to compel compliance with
a court order. Generally, however, fines and imprisonment will be im-
posed only where there is continuing noncompliance with a court or-
der.63 Criminal contempt is punitive in nature and may also result in
fines and imprisonment. While a parent who has abducted his or her
child in defiance of a court order can be held in contempt (based on
either civil or criminal proceedings), this remedy has had little effect in
the child custody area.' First, many abducted children are taken be-
yond the boundaries of the court's jurisdiction, so the court has no
method of enforcing contempt. 61 Second, a subsequent out-of-state
61. 166 N.C. 90, 81 S.E. 1060 (1914).
62. Hudak, Interstate Child, supra note 18, at 279; Hudak, Seize, Run, andSue, supra note
21, at 541.
63. Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 23, at 312.
64. Id.; Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225, 233 (1956).
65. Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 23, at 312-13. See also note 177 infra.
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custody decree may remove the contempt charge. While some authori-
ties recognize the validity of a contempt order even in the face of a
subsequent custody order,66 others have argued that the subsequent
custody decree negates the contempt order.6 7 Thus, contempt would
not seem to be an effective remedy for parental abductions.
2. Civil Liability
Theoretically, civil liability might provide a sanction against parental
kidnapping. Liability could arise between parents for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.6 Unfortunately, this remedy requires
that the custodial parent locate the abducting parent and bring suit in a
court which has personal jurisdiction over the abductor. If a new cus-
tody decree has been granted, it seems unlikely that a court in that
jurisdiction would look favorably upon such a suit. In addition, not all
states recognize this tort.6 9
Civil liability might also arise between the child and the abducting
parent. However, a suit by a child against his or her parents is possible
only in the thirteen states which have abrogated parental immunity.70
Even in those states which have eliminated parental immunity, recov-
ery may be denied if the court concludes that the act was not intended
to harm the child or that the parent's action was within the purview of
proper parental discretion.7 1
3. Criminal Law
The criminal law might also furnish sanctions for parental kidnap-
ping; unfortunately, obtaining a criminal conviction for child stealing is
fraught with difficulties. The first difficulty is the nature of the
offense - child stealing is not a federal crime. An amendment to the
federal kidnapping statute--the Lindbergh Act--specifically exempts
parental abductions. 72  Some states also exempt parents from kidnap-
ping laws. 73 In other states, parental kidnapping is not expressly coy-
66. Brooks v. Brooks, 300 A.2d 531 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1973).
67. See, e.g., Brocker v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 345 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1968) (Roberts, J., con-
curring).
68. Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 23, at 311-12.
69. See, e.g., Prosch v. Yale, 306 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
70. Those states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 23, at 309, 309 n.32, 310.
71. Id. at 310-11.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1971).
73. See, ag., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 337 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-19-1
(1967); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 20.03 (Vernon 1974).
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ered or is governed by a child stealing statute.74 In most instances, a
parent may not be found guilty of child stealing where no custody de-
cree has been awarded since both parents are legally entitled to cus-
tody.75  Where a decree has been awarded, a parent may be found
guilty.7 6  However, since child stealing is usually a misdemeanor,7 7
when the abducting parent flees from a jurisdiction, he or she is gener-
ally not subject to extradition. 8 Even when extradition is technically
possible, it is unlikely that a state which has granted a new custody
order will be willing to extradite the parent. 9 Moreover, police and
prosecutors tend to regard child stealing as a purely "domestic matter"
and are reluctant to intervene.8 0
Another problem with criminal prosecutions is the difficulty of locat-
ing the child and the abducting parent. Since an abducted child is
usually taken into another state, local law enforcement officials from
the child's home state (even if willing) are powerless to try to find the
child. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) generally will not
attempt to locate offending parents because it maintains that since
child stealing is exempt from the federal kidnapping statute, the agency
lacks jurisdiction to pursue abducting parents.81 Moreover, the FBI
adheres to the position that parental abductions are primarily domestic
matters and should not be within the province of federal law enforce-
74. Foster & Freed, supra note 14, at 1015. A report issued by the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office cited a survey which indicated that six states had no criminal
penalties for child stealing. Van de Kamp, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office,
Child Stealing Report 19 (Aug. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Van de Kamp]. California has a
specific statute governing child stealing: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 278-278.5 (West Supp. 1977).
75. State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 131 So. 28 (1930).
76. Lee v. People, 127 P. 1023 (Colo. 1912).
77. Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at 19; Smith, After All the Anguish, They Still Fight,
L.A. Times, Apr. 11, 1977, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
78. The Federal Extradition Act, implementing article IV, § 2, ci. 2 of the United States
Constitution, provides for the extradition of persons charged with "treason, felon[ies] or
other crime[s]." 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970). Because states may enact more liberal extradition
procedures than the federal requirements, forty-six states have adopted the Uniform Crimi-
nal Extradition Act. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRiMINAL LAW 126 n.66 (1972). However,
this Uniform Act contains the same requirement: "treason, felony or other crime." UNI-
FoRM CRuMINAL ExTRADmoN ACr § 2, 11 U.L.A. 54 (1974).
79. Foster & Freed, supra note 14, at 1018; Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at 18.
80. Bernstein, Officials Rapped on Child-Stealing Issue, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1977, § 3, at
13, col 6; Goodman, Child-Snatching, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1976, § A, at 27, col. 6; Peterson,
Child Snatching: The Extralegal Custody Battle After Divorce, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1977, §
C, at 36, col 2; Smith, Kidnaping With Impunity, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 2.
81. Farr, Van de Kamp Hits FBI on 'Stolen Children'Policy, L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, §
2, at 1, col 4, to 2, col 1; Goodman, Child-Snatching, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1976, § A, at 27,
col 6; Smith, Kidnaping With Impunity, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, § 4, at 10, col. 1.
[Vol. I11
PREVENTION OF CHILD STFALING
ment officials. 2 In rare cases, where a parent can prove that a child is
in serious danger, an "unlawful flight to avoid prosecution" warrant83
may be obtained; however, the Department of Justice has a policy
against issuing such warrants.84 Thus, even when local law officials
are willing to treat child stealing as a serious problem, there is little
they can do.
While current child stealing sanctions offer some potential, as pres-
ently used, they can do little to punish or deter parental abductions.
Contempt proceedings are difficult to enforce. Civil liability cases are
difficult to win. Criminal prosecutions are difficult to initiate. Since
neither traditional custody adjudication procedures nor parental kid-
napping penalties has proven effective in dealing with the problem of
child stealing, other alternatives must be considered.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF CHILD
STEALING
Many alternatives to handle the problem of parental abductions
have been suggested. The three most commonly proposed alternatives
are the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, congressional action
to ensure full faith and credit to child custody decrees, and new crimi-
nal sanctions for child stealing.85  While none of these alternatives
82. Farr, Van de Kamp Hits FBI on 'Stolen Children'Policy, L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, §
2, at 1, col. 4, to 2, col. 1; Molinoff, supra note 5, at 10.
83. If a state files a felony charge against a person and that person is believed to have fled
the state, the Department of Justice has the authority to file a federal charge of unlawful
flight to avoid prosecution (UFAP) and obtain a UFAP warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970);
Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at 17. This warrant grants the FBI authority to search for
suspected fugitive state felons.
84. Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at Exhibit B (letter from the office of Benjamin R.
Civiletti, Assistant United States Attorney General, Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice); Smith, After All the Anguish, They Still Fight, L.A. Times, Apr. 11,
1977, § 4, at 8, col. 2; Smith, Kidnaping With Impunity, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, § 4, at 4,
col. 2. Still, one fortunate California parent, Shirley Ryan, is one of the very few parents
who has been able to secure a UFAP warrant. After issuance of the warrant the FBI ar-
rested her ex-husband; he was then extradited from Massachusetts, convicted in California
of child stealing, and sentenced to three years probation. Ms. Ryan also secured the return
of her child. Smith, After,11itheAnguish, They StillFight, L.A. Times, Apr. 11, 1977, § 4, at
11, col. 3. Smith claims that Ms. Ryan is the only parent currently in the United States to
have enjoyed such success. Id. See also Smith, In Search of olie:. A Paper Chase, L.A.
Times, Apr. 20, 1976, § 4, at 1, col. 2. See generally Amendments to the Federal Kidnapping
Statute Hearings on H. 4191 and H.R 8722 Before the Subcomna on Crime of the House
Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55, 62, 72 (1974).
85. For another proposal see Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation.A
Plea for Extraitigious Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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alone is sufficient to cope with the problem of parental kidnapping,
each proposal offers some merit.
A. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act86 (UCCJA) was first
proposed in 1968. The Act is designed to ensure fully informed cus-
tody decrees by providing that the custody decision is-made in the state
with' the closest connection to the child and by bringing all relevant
parties together for the custody decision. The Act is also designed to
promote recognition and enforcement of foreign custody decrees and to
ensure that modifications of a decree will generally be made only in the
court initially rendering the decree. 7 Deterring parental abductions is
one of the basic purposes of the Act, 8 and, as a result, many of the
86. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 103 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited variously as UCCJA or the Act].
87. The UCCJA is based on six fundamental considerations:
1. In order to insure that the initial decree is trustworthy enough to justify respect
and recognition by the courts of other states, it must be a fully informed decree.
2. When custody claimants and the child are scattered over two or more states, a
decision based on full information is attainable if jurisdiction is taken in a state which
has maximum access within its borders to relevant evidence about the child and his
potential future custodians, and if provision is made to channel essential out-of-state
evidence into the adjudicating court.
3. When a custody decision is reached in accordance with these safeguards, the
courts of other states should recognize and enforce it.
4. If a modification of the decree is desired, application should be made to the origi-
nal court, unless the child and family no longer have contact with the state.
5. Any interstate jurisdictional conflict that might arise can be resolved by the pri-
ority-in-time principle or the inconvenient forum rule, aided by interstate judicial com-
munication.
6. In order to avoid continuing controversies over custody, all known custody
claimants should be joined in one proceeding and should receive reasonable notice and
an opportunity to be heard, coupled with strong encouragements (including payment of
travel expenses) to appear personally before the court.
Bodenheimer, Unform Act, supra note 52, at 306.
88. The basic purposes of the UCCJA are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in mat-
ters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from
state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody
decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in
the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships
is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise ofjurisdiction
when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater
stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain
custody awardr,
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basic provisions of the Act are designed to eliminate current incentives
for child stealing.
1. Pro.risions of the UCCJA
The Act attempts to implement the preceding objectives in several
ways. First, the jurisdictional provisions are designed to provide sin-
gle-state jurisdiction in a child custody case. The jurisdictional rules
apply both to the initial proceeding and to the modification of a cus-
tody decree.8 9 The first and primary basis for jurisdiction is the child's
home state, defined as the state in which the child has lived with a
parent or guardian prior to the proceeding for at least six months.90
The home state's jurisdiction remains for six months after the child has
moved to another state.91 If there is no home state, and/or the best
interests of the child would be served thereby, jurisdiction will be deter-
mined under a "significant connection" test. This test requires that the
child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with the
forum state and that there is substantial evidence within that state con-
cerning "the child's present or future care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships."9 It is not necessary for the child to be physically
present within the forum state nor is physical presence sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.93
While it is theoretically possible that the home state and the substan-
tial connection rules might allow more than one state to claim jurisdic-
tion in a custody case, provisions of the Act are designed to prevent
concurrent jurisdiction. Priority of time in filing a petition will confer
jurisdiction upon the state of the initial petition.94 In addition, the Act
codifies provisions for rejecting or declining jurisdiction when a court
is an inconvenient forum.95 The jurisdictional provisions are also
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as
feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the
same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
UCCJA, smupra note 86, § l(a) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 3(a).
90. Id. § 3(a)(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 3(a)(2).
93. Id. §§ 3(b)-3(c). In addition, a state may have jurisdiction if the child is physically
present within the state and has been neglected or subjected to an emergency situation which
might lead to abuse of the child. Id. § 3(a)(3).
94. Id. § 6(a).
95. Determination of an inconvenient forum may be based on several factors:
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designed to discourage child stealing since the home state will retain
jurisdiction even if the child is removed. Should the home state fail to
assert jurisdiction, the mere fact of the child's physical presence in an-
other state is not alone sufficient to allow that state to assume jurisdic-
tion-a significant connection with a forum state is required.9 6  As a
result, it is unlikely that a parent could abduct his or her child and
transport the child to another state which could claim jurisdiction
under the Act.97
In addition to the jurisdictional requirements, the provisions for
modification and enforcement of a sister state's decree should help to
deter parental abductions. The Act codifies the principles of res judi-
cata and full faith and credit by providing that recognition of a sister
state's decree is mandatory where that decree was rendered by a court
assuming jurisdiction under the Act or in circumstances meeting the
jurisdictional standards of the UCCJA.98 Discretionary recognition of
other decrees is not prohibited, but decrees which violate the purposes
of the Act (such as a decree issued after an abduction) should not be
recognized under the standards provided for in section 1 of the Act. 99
A custody decree of a foreign state which is recognized becomes en-
forceable in the recognizing state when a copy of the decree is filed
with the clerk of the appropriate court. °° This process seems to con-
vert the decree into a local decree which is enforceable by any means
available in the state in which it is filed (e.g., contempt proceedings).
(1) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the
child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state;
(4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
(5) if the exercise ofjurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the
purposes stated in section 1.
Id. § 7(c).
96. Id. §§ 3(a)(2), (1).
97. See Bodenheimer, Unform Act, supra note 52, at 307-08.
98. UCCJA, supra note 86, §§ 12-13. The Act assumes that the proper interpretation of
May, text accompanying notes 36-45 supra, is that the Constitution permits (but does not
require) a state to recognize a decree of a sister state with respect to persons over whom the
court did not technically have personaljurisdiction. Bodenheimer, Un/form Act, supra note
52, at 315; Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 8, at 1232. The Act also attempts
to ensure procedural due process by providing reasonable notice and the opportunity to be
heard to any parent whose custodial rights have not been terminated and to any person in
possession of the child. Personal service within the home state is favored but provisions for
out-of-state service are also included. UCCJA, supra note 86, §§ 4-5. See also Foster &
Freed, supra note 14, at 1022.
99. See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 8, at 1235.
100. UCCIA, supra note 86, § 15.
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Although a state may enforce a sister state's decree, the ability to
enforce does not grant the court jurisdiction to modify the decree. A
decree may be modified by the court of a sister state only if the original
court no longer has jurisdiction or has declined jurisdiction, and the
second state meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. 01 These
procedures should discourage abductions since a court will normally
deny a petition for modification of a foreign decree and direct the peti-
tioner back to the original court."02
The UCCJA also codifies the "clean hands" rule. 103 Under the Act
a court may decline jurisdiction when a child is wrongfully detained on
a visit or is wrongfully taken from another state. This principle applies
even when no official custody award has been made in another state.
While a court may decide not to apply this rule to bar litigation if the
interests of the child so require,"° the expenses of other parties having
to travel to assert their rights against an abducting party in a foreign
state may be charged to the abducting parent.105
Since the time that the UCCJA was first proposed, twenty states have
enacted it."°o Most of the enacting states have done so within the last
161. Id. § 14. For example, the Superior Court of Santa Clara County in Morgan v.
Morgan (No. P. 28817, Sept. 16, 1975) denied jurisdiction to hear a father's claim to custody
and returned the child to his mother in Spain (to whom custody had been awarded in a
Swiss court). The court found that Switzerland had continuing jurisdiction and California
had no legal basis for jurisdiction. Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Childrex
The United States Approach, 11 FAM. L.Q. 83, 94 (1977).
102. Bodenheimer, Unforr Act, supra note 52, at 311.
103. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
104. UCCJA, supra note 86, § 8. For example, if a parent could prove that he or she had
kidnapped the child to protect the child from physical abuse by the custodial parent, the
clean hands provision might not bar a custody suit by the kidnapping parent.
105. Id. In addition to these jurisdictional provisions, the Act attempts to ensure fully
informed decrees by providing that one state can request the court of another state to hold a
hearing or investigation relevant to a child's custody and forward certified copies of the
results to the forum court. Id. § 19(a). The Act contains the following provisions which
encourage bringing all parties together in one suit: (I) parties must inform the court of any-
one who claims visitation or custody rights or who possesses the child and any persons so
identified must be joined as parties, id. §§ 9-10, and (2) a court may request a court of
another state to order its resident to appear in the custody determination procedure and
travel expenses for a party so ordered may be advanced or reimbursed, id. § 19(b). The Act
also provides that the clerk of a state court maintain a registry of custody decrees of sister
states and other related records to provide a complete history of the custody procedures
concerning a given child. Id. § 16.
106. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-.30.910 (1977); California, CAL. Crv. CODE §§
5150-5174 (West Supp. 1977); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to 13-126 (1973);
Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925 (Supp. 1976); Florida, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
ch. 77-433; Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001
to -1025 (Supp. 1977); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to .6-24 (Bums Supp. 1977);
Iowa, 1977 Iowa Legis. Serv. 128-13; Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Supp.
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two years so that there is little judicial interpretation of the Act. Those
extant cases which do interpret the Act, while having mixed results,
demonstrate that the Act has the potential to discourage out-of-state
custody adjudications (and thus child stealing). Still, judicial interpre-
tation can also severely reduce the effectiveness of the Act. 107
2. Judicial Interpretation of the UCCJA
To date most of the appellate opinions interpreting the UCCJA have
been from the state of Colorado, so this examination will primarily fo-
cus upon the Colorado cases. Although all of the enacting states may
not follow Colorado's interpretation of the Act, these cases do illustrate
how the Act has been construed thus far. The first of the Colorado
cases, Wheeler v. District Court,08 foreshadowed a trend in the courts
to interpret the home state and significant connection provisions of the
Act as co-equal alternative bases for jurisdiction. In that case, an Illi-
nois decree awarded custody of the Wheeler's three children to the fa-
ther. Thereafter, the father and the children moved to Colorado.
After their move to Colorado, Illinois twice modified the custody
award and granted custody of the children to the mother. The father
then petitioned the Colorado courts for custody and the Colorado
Supreme Court held that Colorado had jurisdiction to modify the Illi-
nois decree.1°9 The court noted that the home state and significant
1977); Michigan, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANl. §§ 600.651-.675 (1976); Minnesota, MiNw. STAT.
A'Nx. §§ 518A.01-.25 (West Supp. 1978); Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 61-401 to
61-425 (Supp. 1977); New York, 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 493; North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-14-01 to 14-26 (1971); Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Page Supp. 1977);
Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109.700-.930 (1975); Pennsylvania, 1977 Pa. Legis. Serv. §§
2301-2325; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01-.25 (West 1977); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT.
§§ 20-143 to -167 (Supp. 1975). Arizona has adopted jurisdictional criteria substantially
similar to those of the UCCJA, ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-331 to -336 (1976), as has Kentucky,
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 403.260 to .350 (Supp. 1976).
107. See text and authorities accompanying notes 108-157 infra. See generally
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining
Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REv.
978 (1977).
108. 526 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1974).
109. The facts were as follows: the Wheelers were divorced in Illinois in January of 1969
and the mother was awarded custody of the three children. In July, 1969 the custody award
was modified and the husband was granted custody. In July, 1973 the father and the chil-
dren moved to Colorado. During August, 1973 the Illinois court again modified the custody
award, granting custody of one child to the mother, thereafter the child was voluntarily
relinquished to her. In November, 1973, in an ex parte proceeding, the Illinois court or-
dered the other two children returned to their mother. The mother filed an enforcement
action in Colorado in March, 1974, and the father cross-petitioned for custody. The trial
court dismissed the father's petition, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the dismis-
sal.
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connection tests were alternative grounds for jurisdiction under the
UCCJA. The court observed that the father had been domiciled and
steadily employed in Colorado for eight months when the Colorado
action was initiated. Further, mention was made that the children had
been in the father's care for almost five years and had attended Colo-
rado schools while residing there. Therefore, the court reasoned that
the children's domicile had moved with the father, giving "this state
: . both a significant connection and enough information to assume
jurisdiction."' 10 While the conclusion reached, that Colorado had a
"significant connection," is acceptable, the court's reasoning has rather
dubious underpinnings. At the time that the final Colorado modifica-
tion of the custody decree was rendered, Colorado had become the
home state of the children living with their father (they had lived in
Colorado for eight months); the court thus might have reached the
same conclusion on the basis of the home state analysis."' Instead, it
based its decision on the significant connection test and ignored the
home state analysis, thereby circumventing the weight to be given to
the home state as a jurisdictional base. The court's reasoning thus ex-
panded jurisdiction so as to include states which were either the child's
home state or which had a significant connection with the child and at
least one litigant.
1 1 2
110. 526 P.2d at 660.
111. This decision might also be questioned on the rationale that Colorado should have
deferred to the continuingjurisdiction of Illinois. The Commissioners' Note to section 14 of
the UCCJA states: "In order to achieve greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid
forum shopping, subsection (a) declares that other states will defer to the continuing juris-
diction of the court of another state as long as that state has jurisdiction under the standards
of the Act." Commissioners' Note to Section 14, UCCJA, supra note 86, at 122. Even
though Illinois had ceased to be the home state of the two children who were living with
their father, Illinois might still have had continuing jurisdiction under the significant con-
nection test.
112. The Oregon courts have reached similar results in two cases. In Moore v. Moore,
546 P.2d 1104 (Or. App. 1976), an Oregon divorce was granted in 1972 and the father was
awarded custody of the Moores' child. The father and child subsequently moved to Wash-
ington. In 1975 the Oregon court entered an ex parte order awarding custody to the mother.
The father refused to surrender the child and instituted a Washington custody proceeding
which determined that the father should retain custody. The father filed a motion in Ore-
gon to enforce the Washington order and to vacate the Oregon order (because the Oregon
court had lacked jurisdiction at the time the order was rendered). The trial court denied the
father's motion and the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination of
whether Oregon's assumption of jurisdiction was consistent with the UCCJA-seemingly
ignoring the fact that Washington was clearly the child's home state and that the child had
not lived in Oregon for several years.
In Carson v. Carson, 565 P.2d 763 (Or. App. 1977), the Oregon Court of Appeals declined
jurisdiction to modify a California decree despite the fact that Oregon was the child's home
state. Subsequent to a 1973 California divorce awarding custody of the child to the father,
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The Colorado Supreme Court further expanded the significant con-
nection test in Nelson v. District Court.113 Subsequent to an Oklahoma
divorce which awarded custody of the child involved to a guardian, the
child and the guardian resided in Montana. Some months later, while
the child was visiting his mother in Colorado, the mother petitioned the
Colorado courts for custody."' Despite the fact that the child was
domiciled in Montana and only temporarily visiting in Colorado, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld Colorado jurisdiction by stating:
"[b]oth parents have a significant connection with Colorado. They are
both domiciled in this state." ' While acknowledging that the child
was not domiciled in Colorado, the court seemed to ignore the fact that
the Act requires that both the child and his parents must have a sub-
stantial connection with the state.'" 6 The court left the child's connec-
tion with Colorado undiscussed.
1 7
The Nelson decision is also troublesome because it cicumvents the
purpose of the clean hands rule. The child came to Colorado to visit
his mother and at the end of the visitation time the mother refused to
surrender the child to his lawful custodian. Additionally, the Colo-
the father and child moved to Oregon. In 1976, while the child was visiting her mother in
California, the mother refused to return the child unless the father appeared in a California
custody suit. The father appeared and the trial court awarded custody to the mother. The
father instituted a custody proceeding in Oregon but the court declined jurisdiction. Recog-
nizing that Oregon was the child's home state, the Oregon Court of Appeals nonetheless
upheld the dismissal on the rationale that California had properly assumed jurisdiction since
the child and the mother had a significant connection with California. Actually, the child's
only connection with California was her visit with her mother so that Oregon would have
been a better forum for the custody litigation.
113. 527 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1974).
114. In the Nelson case, the facts were as follows: Denise and Richard Schweitzer were
divorced in Oklahoma in February, 1974. Temporary custody of their son was awarded to
Jean Nelson of Bainville, Montana, who took immediate custody of the child and returned
to Montana. In July, when the child was visiting his mother in Denver, the mother refused
to return him to Nelson. Subsequently, in Colorado, Nelson filed a habeas corpus petition
and the mother petitioned for permanent custody of the child. Nelson then sought a writ of
mandamus for an immediate hearing on her habeas corpus petition and a writ of prohibition
to prevent the trial court from hearing the mother's petition for custody.
115. 527 P.2d at 813.
116. UCCJA, supra note 86, § 3(a)(2).
117. Chief Justice Pringle, with whom two other justices joined in the dissent, did take
note of the child's connection:
The statute requires that both the child and the parents have a significant connection
with the state before the Colorado court is competent to decide the custody matter.
Here, admittedly, the child per se has no conceivable nexus to Colorado. His only
significant contact is that his parents live here. But that is already required by the
statute as an element separate and apart from the child's nexus. It cannot, of itself,
therefore, supply the nexus required of the child.
527 P.2d at 814 (Pringle, C.J., dissenting).
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rado court ruled that it might hear the mother's petition for custody.
While the court does discuss the clean hands issue, it concludes:
The Child Custody Jurisdiction Act provides that unclean hands,
however, do not deprive the trial court ofjurisdiction. Improper re-
tention of the child should affect only the court's decision to exercise
its jurisdiction. . . . The paramount consideration must be the best
interests of the child, not the wrongdoing of the parent ....
In the case at bar, the trial court exercised its jurisdiction notwith-
standing the mother's unclean hands. It did not commit an abuse of
discretion in so deciding.'
18
This language seems to suggest that if a court determines that jurisdic-
tion attaches under the significant connection test, unclean hands will
not bar the petition. This result would further seem to suggest that the
lawful custodian would have been wiser not to let the child visit his
mother in the first place-a consequence which hardly seems desir-
able.1 9
Not all of the Colorado cases have expanded jurisdiction under the
UCCJA. Two cases decided by the Colorado Court of Appeals appear
to apply the Act in a manner consistent with the framers' intent. In the
first of these cases, In re Custody of Glass,120 a 1973 California divorce
awarded custody of the Glass' child to the mother. In February, 1974
the mother sent the child to visit his father in Colorado. In April,
1974, while the child was still in Colorado, the father successfully peti-
tioned the Colorado courts for custody. However, reasoning that since
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 815 (Pringle, CJ., dissenting). The Oregon Court of Appeals, in Brooks v.
Brooks, 530 P.2d 547 (Or. App. 1975), reached a result similar to the Nelson case. In
Brooks the mother was granted custody of the children in a 1972 Montana proceeding. In
1973 she secretly moved the children to Oregon, preventing the father from visiting them.
In August of 1973 the father petitioned the Montana courts for custody of the children.
Although the mother was served in Oregon, she did not appear and the Montana court
granted custody of the children to the father. In January, 1974 the father petitioned the
Oregon courts for enforcement of the new Montana decree granting him full custodial
rights. The trial court recognized the validity of the Montana order but nonetheless modi-
fied that order to grant custody to the mother. The Oregon Court of Appeals denied en-
forcement of the Montana decree concluding that since the decree was punitive (a response
to the mother's disappearance and her failure to appear in the Montana court), it need not
be enforced. The court also argued that Montana did not have jurisdiction at the time of
the Oregon modification action so there were no reasons why Oregon should not modify the
decree. While this opinion has the strength of discouraging ex parte proceedings under the
Act, it failed to recognize the importance of the home state criterion-Montana was the
children's home state at the time of the Montana modification. The court, additionally,
failed to apply the clean hands doctrine to sanction parental wrongdoing. Here, the chil-
dren had been removed from Montana to avoid enforcement of the father's visitation rights.
Nonetheless, the Oregon court fails to address the clean hands issue.
120. 537 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1975).
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California was the child's home state under the UCCJA, the Colorado
Court of Appeals ruled that Colorado lacked jurisdiction to decide the
child's custody.
12 1
In the second case, In re Custody of Thomas, 2 2 a 1968 Kansas di-
vorce proceeding awarded custody of the Thomas' child to his mother.
The child and his mother remained domiciled in Kansas but the father
moved to Colorado. In 1974, when the child was visiting his father in
Colorado, the father petitioned the Colorado courts for custody of the
child. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the dis-
missal was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals. Reasoning
that since Kansas had jurisdiction over the custody of the child, the
court held that under the UCCJA, the Colorado courts could not mod-
ify the Kansas decree." Both Glass and Thomas demonstrate in-
stances when the Colorado courts have properly declined jurisdiction
when another state continued to be the child's home state.
The Colorado Supreme Court declined jurisdiction to modify a Cali-
fornia decree in Fry v. Ball.24 In that case, the paternal grandmother
had been appointed as the guardian of the Frys' child by a California
court in 1972. In 1974, the grandparents removed the child to Colo-
rado, but shortly thereafter the California court terminated the guardi-
anship.1' The grandparents then petitioned the Colorado courts for
custody. The Colorado Supreme Court, observing that both parents
(who had been awarded custody) were domiciliaries of California, that
the child had been a domiciliary of California until September of 1974,
that the child's guardianship was determined under a California order,
and that the California social agencies had accumulated much infor-
mation regarding the child and his parents, concluded that California
had had jurisdiction at the time it terminated the guardianship and that
it currently retained jurisdiction. Since "[t]he Act attempts to limit
121. Id. at 1094.
122. 537 P.2d 1095 (Colo. App. 1975).
123. Id. at 1097.
124. 544 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1975).
125. More specifically, when the Frys learned of the grandparents' intentions to move to
Colorado and take the child, they secured a temporary restraining order to prevent removal
of the child from California. However, the grandparents left California with the child
before they could be served with the order. Nearly seven months after the child had been
removed to Colorado, the Frys successfully petitioned in California for the termination of
the guardianship and then traveled to Colorado to recover their child. While the guardian
had been willing to surrender the child, an altercation occurred when the parents arrived
and this resulted in the subsequent arrest of the parents for assault. The grandparents then
filed a petition in Colorado for a determination of the child's custody. In response, the Frys
instituted the instant proceeding to enjoin the Colorado trial court from exercising jurisdic-
tion.
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'custody determination to only one state' " and reflects "a general pol-
icy which favors the continuing jurisdiction of the court rendering the
original custody decree," the Colorado court determined that it must
defer to the California courts.
1 26
Despite denying jurisdiction to hear the custody suit, the court,
utilizing its equity powers, allowed the child to remain in the tempo-
rary custody of the grandparents pending the disposition of a petition
for modification in the California courts.127 The rationale for this de-
cision was that stability for the child would be promoted by allowing
him to remain with the grandparents. The goal of promoting stability
for the child is a laudable one, but this decision is unlikely to have that
effect. Since custody had already been awarded to the parents by the
California courts, it is at least as likely (if not more so) that another
California proceeding would reach the same result. The longer the
child remains with the grandparents, the more difficult the transition to
life with his parents will be. 128 Since the UCCJA requires enforcement
of foreign judgments, the California termination of guardianship
should have been enforced.
The most recent Colorado Supreme Court case construing the
UCCJA is Brown v. District Court.129  In Brown, the Colorado
Supreme Court again declined jurisdiction to modify a foreign state's
custody decree. 30 Responding to the mother's petition for the modifi-
cation of a Missouri custody decree, the court noted that the Act man-
dates recognition of out-of-state decrees rendered by courts having
jurisdiction and that the Act encourages continuing jurisdiction by the
original court; thus the court concluded that Missouri retained jurisdic-
tion over the custody matter and Colorado could not modify the Mis-
126. 544 P.2d at 406.
127. Id. at 408.
128. Similar reasoning was employed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in In re McDon-
ald, 74 Mich. App. 119,253 N.W.2d 678 (1977). There, while recognizing that Michigan did
not have jurisdiction to decide the custody of the McDonald child, the court refused to
enforce a Washington order granting temporary custody to the father. The court reasoned
that since the mother currently possessed the child, and that a final order might grant cus-
tody to the mother, requiring a transfer of the child to the father could create instability in
the child's life.
129. 557 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1976).
130. The facts of Brown were as follows: the Browns were divorced in Missouri in March,
1975, and custody of their three children was awarded to the mother. In July, 1975 the
mother and children moved to Colorado. In September, 1975 the mother filed an action, in
Colorado, for a change in the custody decree to terminate the father's visitation rights. The
father moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the fa-
ther's motion; on appeal the Colorado Supreme Court reversed.
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souri decree. 131 The court did not state whether Missouri's jurisdiction
was based on the home state or significant connection test, but since the
children involved had only lived in Colorado for two months at the
time of the mother's petition, Missouri was still their home state. Here,
the home state rule provides an appropriate rationale to deny jurisdic-
tion to the Colorado courts.
Subsequent to Brown, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided In re
Custody ofRector. 32 In that case the Rectors were divorced in Kansas
in 1974 and custody of their son was awarded to the father. In 1975,
the Kansas court modified the decree and awarded custody to the
mother. The father then appealed that decree. However, after the
custody modification, the mother had removed the child to Colorado.
Six months later, while the child and mother were residing in Colo-
rado, and while the Kansas appeal was still pending, the father peti-
tioned the Colorado courts for modification of the Kansas decree. The
trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and the Court
of Appeals affirmed. Pointing out that the Act prohibits a court from
exercising jurisdiction when a proceeding concerning custody of the
child is pending in another state, the court ruled that the pending Kan-
sas appeal precluded Colorado jurisdiction.
1 33
The Colorado opinions seem to indicate a reluctance to fully imple-
ment the UCCJA. Tending to consider the location of the parents
more important than the domicile of the child, the Colorado courts
have interpreted the Act as providing two co-equal bases for jurisdic-
tion. This interpretation has expanded the possibilities for jurisdiction
under the Act. Moreover, as Nelson demonstrates, the Colorado
courts have shown a hesitancy to apply the clean hands doctrine as a
sanction for parental wrongdoing. At the same time, those courts have
indicated some tendency to defer to the jurisdiction of another state if
contacts with Colorado are minimal and the child's home state has pre-
viously assumed jurisdiction over custody, and/or if a custody adjudi-
cation is pending in another state.
While some courts in other states have followed the trend in Colo-
rado, 1 34 other courts have applied the Act in somewhat varied manners.
In Marriage of Settle,1 31 the Oregon Supreme Court failed to enforce
131. 557 P.2d at 385-86.
132. 565 P.2d 950 (Colo. App. 1977).
133. Id. at 952.
134. See text and authorities accompanying notes 112, 119, & 128 supra.
135. 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976).
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an Indiana decree.1 36 Indicating that since the children involved had
lived with a parent in Oregon for more than six months prior to the
institution of the Oregon proceedings, the Oregon Supreme Court con-
cluded that Oregon had jurisdiction as the children's home state.
1 37
The court characterized as a "more troublesome issue" the question of
whether Oregon "should exercise its jurisdiction."'' 38  Since Indiana
was no longer the children's home state, the children lacked a signifi-
cant connection with Indiana, 39 and Indiana did not have a substantial
quantity of evidence about the children's welfare, the Oregon Supreme
Court concluded that Oregon could modify the Indiana decree.
140
Mindful of the Act's incorporation of the clean hands doctrine, the
court concluded that the mother had wrongfully removed the children
from Indiana to avoid a custody proceeding.' 4 ' However, noting that
the Act has dual purposes, discouraging forum-shopping and protect-
ing the best interests of the child, the court decided that the best inter-
ests of the children were paramount and so Oregon could entertain the
suit- despite the mother's wrongdoing. 42 Finally, the Oregon
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had properly found changed
circumstances justifying the custody decree modification.1
4 3
136. The facts of Settle were as follows: in August of 1973 Ms. Settle left the marital
domicile of Indiana with the Settles' two children and moved to Oregon. In November,
1973 she returned to Indiana and there remained. In December, 1973 she filed suit for
divorce. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the mother was granted temporary cus-
tody (pending the outcome of the hearing). In the hearing, the father's answer, filed in
March, 1974, requested that he be given custody of the children. In the latter part of March,
without notifying the court or the father, the mother returned to Oregon with the children.
In May of 1974, without hearing testimony from the mother, the Indiana court awarded
custody to the father. The father then attempted to locate the children and eventually
found them in Oregon. Subsequently, he instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in Oregon
to regain custody of the children pursuant to the Indiana decree. (The court's opinion does
not indicate on what date this action was filed.) Prior to the institution of that proceeding,
the mother had registered the Indiana decree in Oregon and instituted a proceeding for
modification, requesting that she be granted custody. The two actions were consolidated
and the trial court denied the father's petition and awarded custody to the mother. The
Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court remanded the case for reinstitution of the
trial court's award.
137. 556 P.2d at 965.
138. Id.
139. The court indicated that there was no significant connection with Indiana because
the children had been away from Indiana for eighteen months and they had not seen their
father in twenty months. Id. at 966.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 968.
143. Id. at 969.
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Settle illustrates the ineffectiveness of the clean hands doctrine in
discouraging parental abductions. The court failed to deny the suit by
the abducting mother because to do so would not have been "in the
best interests of the child." Since a court might reach this conclusion
in any case, the clean hands doctrine, even under the UCCJA, offers
little hope of deterring parental abductions.
North Dakota considered another aspect of the UCCJA in Giddings
v. Giddings.1" In that case, shortly after an Iowa divorce was granted
and custody awarded to the mother, the father took the child on a per-
mitted visit to North Dakota. The father did not return the child
promptly and the mother obtained a contempt order in Iowa. The
mother then traveled to North Dakota and filed an ex parte motion to
enforce the contempt order. An enforcement order was granted by the
trial court but reversed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Indicat-
ing that the trial court could proceed so long as the due process require-
ments of the Act were met, the Supreme Court ruled that the ex parte
order violated the Act's notice and opportunity to be heard provi-
sions.145 This result is not required by the plain language of the
UCCJA since the due process provisions apply only to the issuance or
modification of custody decrees, but not to enforcement proceedings.
Still, the result does not seem inconsistent with the emphasis within the
Act on ensuring procedural due process.
The California Court of Appeal considered the applicability of the
UCCJA for the first time in McDowell v. Orsini.146 In McDowell,
147
the court of appeal ruled that California could not consider a father's
visitation rights in a support enforcement action because California
had no basis for jurisdiction in a custody matter under the UCCJA.
1 48
Since the child resided in Pennsylvania, California was not his home
state for jurisdictional purposes. The court also concluded that none
144. 228 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1975).
145. Id. at 919.
146. 54 Cal. App. 3d 951, 127 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1976).
147. In McDowell, a New York divorce was granted in 1972, and, while no formal cus-
tody decree was rendered, the.child remained with his mother. Subsequently, the father
moved to California and the mother and child moved to Pennsylvania. In 1974, a hearing
was held in California to enforce a support order issued by an earlier California decision.
The court allowed a de novo consideration of the support order and, upon the father's re-
quest, a consideration of the issue of the father's right to visitation. The trial court's order
purported to make a determination with respect to both visitation rights and support duties.
148. The court of appeal also ruled that the visitation determination was improper be-
cause it was made without written application to the court. Thus, under the provisions of
the UCCJA, the mother was denied reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 54
Cal. App. 3d at 961-62, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92.
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of the other possible bases for jurisdiction were applicable.' 49 In this
decision, the court correctly declined jurisdiction because a home state
determination could properly be made in Pennsylvania where the child
resided.
A review of the decisions leads to several conclusions regarding cur-
rent judicial interpretation of the UCCJA. The cases indicate that:
(1) ex parte proceedings are to be discouraged;150 (2) the notice and
opportunity to be heard sections of the Act will be strictly construed; 
151
(3) a state will defer to the jurisdiction of another state when a custody
proceeding is pending in that state;15 1 (4) the home state and significant
connection tests are construed as co-equal alternative bases for jurisdic-
tion and a state may assume jurisdiction when either test is met;15 3 (5)
the clean hands provision is rarely applied and has little effect on pa-
rental conduct; 54 (6) if a state has made a custody determination under
the provisions of the Act, or in substantial conformity with the Act, and
both parties appeared before the court, another state is more likely to
defer to the jurisdiction of the former state;1 55 and (7) even when a state
has deferred to the jurisdiction of a sister state, the deferring state is
unlikely to enforce a decree by the sister state granting temporary cus-
tody to a party not currently in possession of the child.
156
The courts of other states may not follow the trends reviewed here.
If, however, other states do follow these trends, the UCCJA alone will
clearly be insufficient to prevent child stealing.15 7 Although the Act
was designed to restrict the number of jurisdictions that could hear
child custody suits, current judicial interpretations have expanded the
situations in which more than one state may have jurisdiction to hear a
custody suit. The result is an incentive to remove the child from an
area in which an unfavorable determination might be (or has been)
made and to sue for custody in another jurisdiction. Since courts are
unwilling to bar such suits on the basis of the clean hands doctrine, the
abducting parent has little to fear. This situation could be substan-
tially improved by clarifying the provisions of the Act.
149. Id. at 962-63, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
150. See text accompanying notes 119 & 144-45 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 144-48 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 108-17 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 118-19 & 141-42 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 120-26, 129-31, & 146-49 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
157. See Trescott, Child-Snatching: A Legal 'Crime', Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1976, § B, at 3,
cols. 1-2.
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3. The UCCJA: Suggested Revisions
Since current judicial interpretation of the UCCJA has not ensured
single-state jurisdiction in custody cases, jurisdictional standards
should be clarified to reflect the priority of the home state.' 58 Several
revisions should be considered. First, the Act contains no clear defini-
tion of what constitutes the "best interests of the child."' 59 If specific
unambiguous criteria for this standard were provided, jurisdiction
could be effectively restricted. Such criteria could make it clear that
jurisdiction will normally reside in the home state and only in hlghly
unusual circumstances would another state have jurisdiction in a cus-
tody case. This addition would be consistent with the drafters' inten-
tions.16 When coupled with a presumption that no jurisdiction exists
in a state to which an abducted child has been taken, specific "best
interests" criteria would make it clear that only in highly exceptional
circumstances (such as danger to the child's health) would the clean
hands doctrine fail to bar a suit by a wrongful parent.
Restriction of jurisdiction will effectively deter custody modifications
only if courts enforce the decrees of their sister states. Although recog-
nition and enforcement of the decrees of a sister state are mandatory
under section 13 of the Act, courts have treated recognition and en-
forcement of temporary awards as permissive. This position is con-
trary to the language and purposes of the Act. To effectuate the
purposes of the Act, courts must accept the judgments of their sister
states (including determinations of the issue of the child's stability) and
recognize and enforce decrees rendered under the provisions of the Act.
This change requires not a statutory alteration, but rather a modifica-
tion of judicial attitudes. While such, a change of attitudes is not al-
ways easy to accomplish, if judges are made aware of the instability
created by the failure to recognize and enforce temporary custody de-
crees, judicial compliance with the purposes of the Act should increase.
While the suggested reforms would help make the UCCJA more ef-
fective, the Act would still be insufficient to fully cope with the prob-
lem of parental kidnapping because it offers no means to search for and
locate the abducting parent. 6 Even if a state renders a contempt de-
158. The drafters intended that the Act would provide for single-state jurisdiction. See
Commissioners' Note to Section 3, UCCJA, supra note 86, at 107.
159. See Comment, Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act Offers Little Hope ofResolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REv. 820, 834-35
(1976).
160. See Commissioners' Note to Section 3, UCCJA, supra note 86, at 107-09.
161. Even if the Act deters some parental abductions, others will undoubtedly occur.
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cree against an abducting parent, there is no way for sister states to
enforce the contempt order if the offender cannot be found.
California has amended its version of the UCCJA with provisions
that would help to discourage abductions and to locate the offending
parent. Under those amendments, a court declining jurisdiction for an
initial custody decree must notify the parent or guardian and the prose-
cuting attorney in the appropriate state. On motion, the California
court may order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody
proceeding in another state and/or may place the child in the care of
the court for return to the legal custodian.' These provisions supple-
ment the Act by ensuring notice to relevant persons of the location of
the child even when a new custody action cannot be heard. The lawful
custodian would thus be more likely to recover the child. In addition,
these provisions, if added to the UCCJA and universally adopted,
would discourage an abducting parent from initiating new custody pro-
ceedings in an attempt to gain judicial authorization for possession of
the child, and would aid in locating a parent who had already done so.
The UCCJA is the primary, but not the only, reform which has been
proposed to deal with the problem of child stealing. Additional
changes in custody adjudication procedures and new criminal penalties
have also been suggested.
B. Other Legislative Reforms
Suggested legislative revisions to curb child snatching (other than the
UCCJA) have centered on two principal areas, full faith and credit and
new criminal penalties for parental abductions. Proposals in both ar-
eas merit consideration.
Since Congress may enact legislation to implement the full faith and
credit clause,' 63 Congress could enact legislation requiring states to
grant full faith and credit to child custody decrees. Some authorities
have recommended such an action," and bills have been introduced
in both the House 65 and Senate 66 to effectuate this recommendation.
Some provision for locating the kidnapped children must be made to ensure that the chil-
dren are returned to their lawful custodians.
162. CAL. CIw. CODE § 5157 (West Supp. 1977). See also Foster & Freed, supra note 14,
at 1024-25.
163. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1973) which provides that a court shall give the same full
faith to a decree of a sister state as would the rendering court.
164. See, e.g., Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Rolefor Congress,
1964 Sup. CT. REv. 89; 123 CONG. REc..S2982 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
McGovern).
165. H.R. 10977, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
166. S. 797, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
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However, no action has been taken on any of these bills.
Even if congressional action were taken, federal legislation to man-
date full faith and credit for custody decrees would be insufficient to
solve the problem of parental kidnapping. First, full faith and credit
would apply only to final decrees. Thus, a parent might still abduct
his or her child before a final decree is rendered and file a custody
petition in another state.167 Second, a state might grant full faith and
credit to a sister state's decree and still proceed to modify that decree
on the basis of changed circumstances. As a result, a parent would still
be encouraged to flee with the child to another jurisdiction.16 Third,
this suggestion provides no method for locating the abducting parent
and the child. While granting full faith and credit is probably a neces-
sary step to help deter child stealing, this proposal alone is inadequate
to achieve that goal.
69
Reform of criminal laws is the other primary means suggested as an
answer to parental kidnapping.x 0 The state of California has passed
legislation against child stealing which makes the act a felony with pen-
alties of up to four years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine.17 1 The law
mandates that "the district attorney shall take all actions necessary" to
locate violators.1 72 Since the crime is a felony, the law ensures the
availability of extradition l73 and gives prosecutors wide latitude to try
to find violators.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has established a
parent locator service in connection with child support enforcement.
1 74
This agency has the power to search police, Internal Revenue Service,
167. See Molinoff, supra note 5, at 11. One organization claims that as many as sixty-
eight percent of all snatchings occur before custody hearings begin. Daniloff, Parents Lose
Faith in the Law as Child-Snatchings Increase, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1978, § 2, at 5, col. 4.
168. See Ratner, supra note 23, at 832.
169. It would probably be less circuitous to have the Supreme Court rule definitively as to
what constitutes a final decree in child custody litigation and, thus, what kind of decree is
entitled to full faith and credit. Unfortunately, such an event seems unlikely. See text
accompanying notes 32-50 supra. In addition, such a procedure would do nothing to pro-
tect children where a "fital" decree had not yet been rendered and, thus, would not prevent
child stealing.
170. See Amendments to the Federal Kidnapping Statute: Hearings on H.9 4191 and H.J A
8722 Before the Subcommr on Crime of the House Comn on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
(1974).
171. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 278-278.5 (West Supp. 1978). The prosecutor retains discre-
tion to file only misdemeanor charges in less serious cases.
172. CAL. Cir. CODE § 4604(b) (West Supp. 1978).
173. Of course, another state may still refuse to extradite an abducting parent.
174. Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at 19-20.
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and Social Security records to locate missing parents. Under the new
California law, prosecutors may request information from this agency.
Unfortunately, prosecutors' offices and police agencies have not yet
been given access to this service in connection with child stealing
cases. 175 If access were granted, this service would undoubtedly be an
aid in locating stolen children and their abducting parents.
Although California's legislation is a step forward, legislation on a
state-by-state basis is unlikely to be effective in alleviating the problem
of child stealing. Individual states lack the mechanisms to locate of-
fending parents who flee their jurisdictions. The new federal service
will be helpful, but it does not provide a means to positively search for
the abductor. Since the office relies on records gathered for other pur-
poses, the time lag in finding an abducting parent could be considera-
ble. 176  What is really needed is the FBI's assistance in locating
offending parents. 177
Legislation to make child stealing a federal crime has been intro-
duced in both the House 17 8 and the Senate. 179 Under the House bill,
which was first proposed in 1973, child stealing would be a misde-
meanor with penalties of up to one year in prison and/or a $1,000 fine.
Congressman Bennett has been trying to have such legislation passed
for five years, but to no avail. The Senate bill would make child steal-
ing a misdemeanor with penalties of up to six months in jail and up to a
$10,000 fine. This bill also mandates full faith and credit for child
custody decrees. Recently, the Senate bill was appended as an amend-
ment to the Senate's Criminal Code Reform Act (S. 1437) and the Re-
form Act was passed by the Senate on January 30, 1978.180 The Senate
version is the better of the two bills. The House bill would apply only
if a final custody determination were rendered while the Senate bill
would apply "where neither a valid court decree or express agreement
exist [sic] [but one parent abducts and secrets the child] in violation of
175. Id. at 20.
176. The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office noted: "it takes four to six months to
obtain information which, upon receipt, usually provei to be stale." Id.
177. Los Angeles District Attorney Van de Kamp has said that "[s]o many of these chil-
dren are taken into other states that the assistance of the FBI is crucial... Because the
FBI operates in all states, it is uniquely qualified to perform this task." Farr, Van de Kamp
Hits FBI on 'Stolen Children' Policy, L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
178. This bill has been introduced many times, most recently as H.R. 4001, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H1479 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).
179. An amendment to S. 1437,95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S498 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1978).
180. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. D56 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
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the natural custodial rights of [the other parent]."' s '
Both bills have the advantage of giving the FBI clear authority to
investigate child stealing cases. Thus, locating the offending parent
would be facilitated. However, the penalties provided for in the bills
are so small that it is unlikely that they would have any deterrent ef-
fect.18 To provide a serious deterrent, stronger penalties are neces-
sary.
Use of the criminal law to cope with child stealing has been criticized
for several reasons. First, providing criminal sanctions does not re-
move the parent's motive for abducting the child. A parent may de-
cide to abduct the child and hope for a custody modification in another
state. If a modification is granted, a criminal conviction is unlikely.
183
This argument would lose effect, however, with uniform adoption of
the UCCJA (along with the amendments to the Act recommended
herein' 84 ) since an abducting parent would be denied access to the
courts in another jurisdiction. 85 In addition, the fear of punishment
would be likely to deter some parents from kidnapping their children.
The second criticism, aimed at federal criminal penalties, is that the
FBI lacks the motivation and the resources to chase child snatchers. 186
However, if the FBI were given clear statutory authority to pursue kid-
napping parents, the agency would be more inclined to do so.187
Moreover, even if it is true that the FBI lacks the resources to handle
this problem, the answer lies in increasing the FBI's resources rather
than continuing to ignore the problem."88
A third criticism of criminal sanctions is that they might result in the
anamolous situation of a parent's being awarded custody and also be-
ing found guilty of criminal child stealing. 18 9 This could only occur if
a parent abducted the child and later obtained a custody modification
181. 124 CONG. REc. S501 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978).
182. Molinoff, supra note 5, at 11.
183. As with contempt, it seems improbable that a court which has found a parent fit for
custody would participate in a criminal conviction. See text accompanying notes 63-67 &
79 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
185. The Senate bill, supra notes 179-81, also provides recognition and enforcement of
foreign decrees.
186. Molinoff, supra note 5, at 10-11.
187. In California, despite the fact that before the adoption of the new criminal statute the
police were reluctant to intervene, police cooperation has increased since the passage of the
act. Police are more willing to take reports, investigate, and bring violations to the attention
of prosecutors. Van de Kamp, supra note 74, at 16.
188. Molinoff, supra note 5, at 11.
189. See Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modifi-
cation of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. CoLo. L. REv. 495, 505-06 (1975).
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in another state. With simultaneous adoption of the UCCJA, this par-
adoxical result would not occur.
The final major criticism aimed at the criminal law is that parents
are well intentioned and should not be subjected to criminal sanctions.
Moreover, it is argued that the child may be harmed by the jailing of
his or her parent.190 This argument fails to acknowledge the serious-
ness of child stealing. The instability created by being kidnapped by a
parent may have serious and permanent consequences which psycho-
logically scar the child.191 Thus, the parent's "good intentions" are
really irrelevant. If the parent were truly concerned with the child's
interests, he or she would participate in a full hearing on the issue of
custody-allowing the court to determine the issue on the basis of all
available evidence. Additionally, the reasoning that the child might
suffer harm and disadvantage by putting his or her parent in jail also
misses the point. If our criminal policies were based on this notion we
would not penalize parents for physical or sexual child abuse, or any
other crime for that matter, because to do so might be harmful to the
child. Being kidnapped by one's parent is certain to be harmful to the
child. At best, this criticism is an argument for flexible criminal penal-
ties. A law which would give the prosecutor discretion to charge an
offender with either a felony or a misdemeanor and which would pro-
vide penalties similar to California's (a maximum of four years impris-
onment and/or a $10,000 fine) would furnish this flexibility. In cases
of a less serious nature the offending parent might be charged only with
a misdemeanor. If a prison term would be unnecessarily harsh, a con-
victed child stealer might simply be fined. Such a law would provide
penalties sufficiently severe to deter many would-be abductors and, if
enacted on the federal level, to give the FBI the necessary jurisdiction
to search for child stealers who flee and attempt to hide from authori-
ties.
While current reform proposals contain many valuable ideas, at-
tempts at reform have been largely piecemeal. To effectively discour-
age parental kidnapping, a uniform national policy must be designed
which ensures that, generally, only one state will be responsible for a
child's custody determination and that full faith and credit will be
granted to custody decrees. Additionally, criminal penalties must be
fashioned which are sufficiently severe to deter such conduct and
190. See Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Childrem The United States
Approach, 11 FAM. L.Q. 83,99 (1977); Moving to Stop Child Snatching, TIME, Feb. 27, 1978,
at 85.
191. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
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which grant the FBI jurisdiction to search for offending parents. In
essence, what is needed is a comprehensive national policy to cope with
child stealing.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis presented herein leads to the conclusion that a compre-
hensive national policy should be adopted to deal with the problem of
child stealing. While many of the proposals which have been sug-
gested are insufficient in isolation, if woven into a comprehensive pol-
icy, they would work together to help to reduce the incidence of child
stealing. Specifically, the following recommendations are made:
(1) The UCCJA should be amended to:
(a) provide clear criteria for the "child's best interest" stan-
dard;
(b) ensure that the home state will normally be the only state
with jurisdiction in a child custody matter and allow juris-
diction in other states only in extraordinary circumstances;
(c) create a presumption that the state to which an abducting
parent has fled does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
custody matters and ensure that only in highly unusual cir-
cumstances (such as threat of physical harm to the child)
would such a state have custody jurisdiction;
(d) provide that when a court declines jurisdiction in an initial
or modifying custody proceeding, the parent or guardian
in another state and the appropriate district attorney shall
be notified; and to
(e) provide that upon proper motion, a petitioner in a pro-
ceeding where custody jurisdiction has been declined may
be ordered by the court to appear with the child in a cus-
tody proceeding in another state and/or that the court may
take charge of the child who has been abducted and return
him or her to the legal custodian.
(2) All states should enact such an amended version of the UCCJA.
(3) Congress should enact legislation providing that full faith and
credit shall be granted to custody decrees.
(4) The states and the federal government should enact legislation
making child stealing chargeable as either a misdemeanor or a
felony, depending upon the seriousness of the offense, with pen-
alties of up to four years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine;
(a) child stealing should be defined to include situations
where no formal custody adjudication has taken place but
a person, abducting the child, has deprived another of en-
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forceable custody rights;192 and
(b) the federal legislation should give the FBI a clear mandate
to investigate parental abductions and it should provide
for any necessary expansion of the FBI's resources.
While this comprehensive policy will probably not eliminate child
stealing, its occurrence would likely be reduced. By ensuring that only
one state has jurisdiction for custody determinations and specifically
denying the abducting parent access to the courts of states other than
the one in which the child resides, the proposal would eliminate many
of the incentives for child snatching: a parent, for example, will know
that he or she cannot abduct the child and seek another custody adjudi-
cation elsewhere. Moreover, the requirement that full faith and credit
be granted to custody decrees will prevent many modifications of for-
eign decrees and thus provide an added disincentive to parental kid-
napping. While some parents, fearing loss of the children, may still
abduct their children, the notification procedures combined with the
FBI investigative provisions would make locating the offending parent
and the child less difficult. Even in situations in which the abducting
parent does not seek the aid of the courts and makes positive efforts to
conceal his or her and the child's location, FBI investigative capabili-
ties would make finding the abductor and the child possible in many
cases. A parent contemplating an abduction will know that crossing
state lines will no longer shield an abducting parent from police investi-
gations. Additionally, severe, but flexible penalties for child stealing
would help to deter the would-be abductor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Annually, thousands of children are kidnapped by one of their par-
ents and taken to a foreign jurisdiction in search of a more favorable
custody decree. Such abductions may cause serious psychological
damage to the children involved and should, therefore, be prevented.
However, under the laws of most states, abductions are facilitated be-
cause states often refuse to recognize and enforce the custody decrees of
sister states, acting instead to modify them. Moreover, neither civil nor
criminal liability as currently applied has proven effective to punish or
deter such abductions. The UCCJA, with its goal of providing single-
state jurisdiction in custody cases, is a promising alternative despite
current judicial interpretation of the Act which has threatened its via-
bility by expanding the bases of jurisdiction under the Act. Universal
192. Enforceable custody rights would be based on either a court decree or the natural
custodial rights of a parent.
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adoption of the UCCJA, with the amendments recommended herein to
restrict child custody jurisdiction, in combination with the adoption of
federal and state criminal penalties for child stealing, should greatly
reduce the incidence of this problem. The policy proposed herein
would reduce the incentive for child stealing by preventing a parent
from obtaining-a modification of a custody decree in a sister state.
With criminal penalties for parental kidnapping, such behavior would
be deterred. For those not deterred, the FBI could aid in locating the
offending parent and the abducted child. The proportions of this
problem are too great to ignore any longer. If child custody is to en-
sure that the best interests of the child are fulfilled, a comprehensive
national child stealing policy must be enacted.
Judith A. Sanders
